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         Cryptocurrencies as market singularities: The strange case of Bitcoin  
    
                                                           
                                                       ABSTRACT   
Since its creation in 2009 the electronic currency Bitcoin has generated volumes of 
online debate in the business press. While there have been plenty of economic 
arguments situating it as a financial bubble about to collapse including from Nobel 
Prize winning economists; its price value has proven to be more durable than many 
have predicted. To explain this durability, Karpik’s conception of market singularities 
is used to understand the Bitcoin phenomenon by outlining the beliefs that maintain 
Bitcoin’s status as a volatile financial asset. Market singularities are markets for 
particular kinds of goods and services that are of uncertain and incommensurable 
value. Singularities markets have communities of followers and a distinctive belief 
system that ascribes value to a particular product, service, or asset. Developing 
Karpik’s conception, the paper explores the libertarian political belief system that 
surrounds Bitcoin’s status as a financial asset. I also outline some political tensions 
within the electronic currency community concerning governance and centralization. 
 
                                                   KEYWORDS 
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The electronic currency Bitcoin that emerged in 2009 created by Satoshi Nakamoto 
(Nakamoto, 2009) (a name widely believed to be a pseudonym of some description) is 
undoubtedly the most significant intervention in the field of electronic currency. 
Despite many notable predictions of its imminent demise, coming from Nobel Prize 
winning economists (Krugman, 2013a; Shiller, 2014) amongst others, it still exists as 
a significant entity in the financial landscape. Bitcoin has gained widespread 
recognition through online media, and despite high volatility it remains a marginal but 
distinctive financial asset (Moore and Christin, 2013). Here I consider why the price 
value of this peculiar asset has proven to be more durable than many of the critical 
predictions have suggested (see for example Williams, 2013).  
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Karpik’s (2010: 10) conception of market singularities can be defined loosely as 
markets for goods and services, which are of uncertain and incommensurable value. 
Now this is clearly a broad category but it refers to everyday goods and services, like 
records or legal services, as well as more exclusive entities, such as works of art or 
fine wines. Singularities are distinctive goods and services that are based around 
specific kinds of knowledge and judgment (Karpik, 2010: 11). The markets around 
these goods and services are shaped by communities of followers who believe in these 
singularities and make a judgment about their worth.  
 
Value is clearly a multifaceted concept and at least two dimensions of value are in 
play in the following analysis of the Bitcoin market: value established through market 
price, which is the predominant conception of value within economics; and value 
understood as a collective ascription of worth (see Burling, 1962; see also Guyer, 
2004: 84). The two dimensions of value are complimentary since one is more likely to 
invest in something if you consider it to have worth, but the key argument here is that 
one cannot understand the reasons for Bitcoin’s economic value without examining 
the non-economic and social elements supporting its value. This latter conception of 
value can be understood as a social ascription of worth that is centred on knowledge, 
belief and judgment (Karpik, 2010). As Guyer (2004: 84) notes, this cannot be 
reduced to price, since price indicators do not provide the criteria with which to judge 
how or why something has worth or quality. As Karpik (2010) highlights, judgements 
of worth must be established through social processes of valuation (see also Caliskan, 
2004), in which knowledge and belief plays a key role.  
 
Karpik’s conception of market singularities can add to the analysis of Bitcoin by 
highlighting the role of belief systems and judgment in sustaining its price value. 
While previous cultural economy analysis of price valuation has focused on how 
prices are made and produced (Caliskan, 2007) and how ascriptions of quality relate 
to particular markets (Guyer, 2004), Karpik’s conceptual toolkit gives us some 
additional tools to examine the social processes of valuation within particular, 
distinctive and incommensurable, goods and services markets. His analysis also 
highlights the role of belief which is particularly important in the Bitcoin market.  
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In this context, beliefs are understood as viewpoints. While belief systems refer to 
established and interconnected sets of viewpoints and practices. These belief systems 
can also be named and characterised as ideological and in doing so one situates them 
as political. The political denotes points of conflict or disagreement, which can occur 
around and within singularities markets. Broadly speaking, a political belief is a view 
about how the social world should operate that is in conflict with others. 
 
To a certain extent all markets are underpinned by belief systems, including financial 
investments. But these belief systems are more pronounced in some markets than 
others. Conventional economic analysis tends to focus on information and calculation 
as determinants of price value rather than beliefs. Indeed, economists have often 
dismissed Bitcoin on the basis that it has no underlying real value (see for example 
Cheah and Fry, 2015) since it is not supported by the state or any legal authority 
unlike national fiat currency. In contrast to this, Karpik (2011) draws out the 
importance of judgment and particular kinds of knowledge which give life to and 
sustain particular markets through socially ascribing worth. Given that Bitcoin is by 
far the most widely recognised cryptocurrency, it is the principal focus of the analysis 
that follows. However, in the final section of the paper in order to highlight the 
political tensions within cryptocurrency markets I will broaden the analysis to other 
cryptocurrency communities.  
 
Not a physical entity as such, Bitcoin works through an expanding record of 
transactions, all of these transactions are readable and the history of previous 
transactions validates future transactions (Böhme et al., 2015: 215). Thus one of the 
key advantages that Bitcoin is meant to have over government fiat currencies is that 
because Bitcoin works through cryptography and peer2peer transactions there is no 
central authority either issuing the currency or regulating it. Instead, Bitcoin are 
bundled into blocks, blocks are generated through a computer mining process to 
discover a hash code, which when discovered releases the next block of Bitcoin. A 
key claim in this paper is that the durability of Bitcoin’s price value is sustained by 
the belief system of the community that surround it. Drawing on Karpik’s (2010) 
conception of market singularities, I situate Bitcoin as a peculiar ideological market 
singularity, which is characterised by a libertarian belief system.  
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The contributions of the paper are that I develop a fresh understanding of the Bitcoin 
market by applying Karpik’s framework to cryptocurrency, and I develop his analysis 
by highlighting the importance of the political beliefs surrounding Bitcoin. While 
libertarianism underpins the Bitcoin ecosystem, to be a member of the Bitcoin market 
one does not have to be a libertarian, since some own Bitcoin out of curiosity or 
because of an interest in computer programming and cryptography. However, the 
principal libertarian political belief underpinning Bitcoin is the view that a currency 
that works through blockchain cryptography, which is not controlled by any state or 
central authority, is both sustainable and desirable. 
 
I begin by outlining more conventional economic perspectives on Bitcoin and 
highlight a crucial missing ingredient in these accounts, which is the belief systems 
that maintain its price value. In the second section, I outline the concept of market 
singularities and the tools it offers for further empirical analysis of the Bitcoin market. 
Here the analysis is focused around judgment and judgment devices. After this, the 
libertarian belief system around Bitcoin is examined. In the final section I point to 
some of the political tensions within Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency communities 
concerning both centralization and governance. 
  
Economist Perspectives on Bitcoin 
 
Most academic articles on Bitcoin have focused on the technical concerns of 
computer programmers and cryptographers, including the degree of anonymity of the 
currency and technical glitches and hacking dangers (see for example Moore and 
Christen, 2013). Several other papers and government documents have examined the 
ambiguous legal status of the currency (see for example FinCEN, 2013). 
 
Bitcoin has been an exploratory subject across a range of disparate fields, including 
computer science (Grinberg, 2011), social media studies (Garcia, et al., 2014), social 
network analysis (Meiklejohn, 2013), money laundering (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 
2014), economics (Cheah and Fry, 2015), political economy (Weber, 2016), and in 
philosophical discussions about the nature of money (Maurer et al., 2013). This paper 
approaches Bitcoin and electronic currency from a different angle, which is a cultural 
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economy perspective focused on an investigation into why Bitcoin continues to have 
price value, and the importance of the political beliefs that underpinning it. 
 
The most prominent group of Bitcoin critics have been academics working in finance 
and economists. Economic critiques have been put forward principally via social 
media; in contrast, academic economic analyses of Bitcoin and electronic currency 
are relatively scarce (Cheah and Fry, 2015: 35). The economic scepticism around 
Bitcoin is neatly summarised by Williams (2013) who argues that ‘Bitcoin is not a 
legitimate currency but simply a risky virtual commodity bet’ with a flawed DNA. 
These critiques of Bitcoin have been based around the following objections, often 
with some combination of all three: First, any viable currency requires banking and a 
central authority and because Bitcoin does not have this it is unsafe and prone to fraud 
(Williams, 2013). A classic example of this problem was evident during the collapse 
of what was the largest Bitcoin exchange, Mt. Gox, in February 2014 amidst 
allegations of corruption (see Greenberg, 2014). Second, Bitcoin is far too volatile to 
operate as a unit of account and therefore it will never be a sustainable and widely 
used currency (Ali, 2014). Third, there is no secure basis for Bitcoin’s price and it is 
simply a speculative bubble with a Ponzi character (see for example Cheah and Fry, 
2015). In this kind of economic analysis, value is understood purely through price 
(see Burling, 1962). The third economic argum nt centres on the point that, unlike 
Bitcoin, national fiat currency is backed by the state and this underlies its value. As 
Krugman (2013b) neatly puts it, ‘fiat currency is backed by men with guns whereas 
Bitcoin is not, so why should this thing have any value?’ 
 
Some of these critiques have proven to be overstated, particularly Williams’s claim 
that one Bitcoin will be valued at $10 by mid 2014 (Williams, 2013) - the value of 
one Bitcoin was $319.70 at the close of 2014 (Coin Desk, 2016). Williams’s bold and 
ultimately incorrect prediction has become an infamous one in the Bitcoin 
community, but it is a useful one for our purposes here because Williams is specifying 
a point at which, at least for some economic critics, the Bitcoin bubble will be deemed 
to have burst and it will no longer have significant value. The paper is intended to 
provide at least a partial explanation for why the price value of a Bitcoin has not 
collapsed and continues to be substantially higher than $10. 
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However, the problems surrounding Bitcoin’s widespread adoption as a currency - its 
volatility and the technological sophistication required to use it - do tend to push it 
towards the status of a financial asset more than a currency (see Burniske and White, 
2016). This is reflected in the extent to which Bitcoins are stored, or rather hoarded, 
and not circulating. There are differing estimates of the proportion of Bitcoins that are 
not circulating, but in a widely cited paper Meiklejohn et al. (2013) put the figure at 
64%, and a Bank of England quarterly bulletin notes that a popular online site where 
people can hold their Bitcoin, known as ‘My Wallet’, had 0.02 transactions per day in 
2014 (Alli, 2014: 5). This suggests that Bitcoin have a tendency to be held as a 
speculative store of value, rather than a currency that is used for the exchange of 
goods and services even though it continues to be used by a minority for this purpose 
(Alli, 2014).  
 
The history of Bitcoin price has been marked by extreme volatility driven by various 
crises at different points. These crises events have been triggered by a variety of 
concerns about the currency, such as regulatory curbs of Bitcoin activity – for 
example the Peoples Bank of China’s issued a note in December 2013 which banned 
financial companies from undertaking Bitcoin transactions (Bloomberg, 2013). Yet 
the most serious crises have been sparked by problems internal to the Bitcoin 
community, for example the largest Bitcoin exchange – sites where people buy and 
sell Bitcoin – Mt. Gox collapsed in February 2014 (Greenberg, 2014).  
 
Dramatic drops in Bitcoin exchange value in short time periods have led a range of 
online commentators to declare the end of Bitcoin on more than one occasion (see for 
example Financial Times, 2014; Hearn, 2016). The history of Bitcoin price is 
characterised by rapid rises and sharp depreciations, which have then been followed 
by a degree of Bitcoin price recovery (Coin Desk, 2016); illustrating that its price 
value is far more durable than many, such as Williams (2013), have assumed. From 
its creation in 2009, Bitcoin was intended to work as an alternative cash payment 
system that cuts out the need for any central authority through cryptographic 
innovation (Nakomoto, 2009). Yet there is a tendency to hoard the currency as a 
speculative asset rather than spend it, at least for a large proportion of Bitcoin owners. 
Given the many predictions of its immanent demise, how do we explain the 
continuing market value of Bitcoin? To address this, we need to engage with the 
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belief systems that surround Bitcoin, in order to better understand the characteristics 
of this peculiar market asset.  
 
Virtual Currency and Market Singularities 
 
Market singularities are goods and services whose value is multidimensional, 
uncertain and incommensurable (Karpik, 2010: 16). This incommensurability means 
that these goods cannot be reduced to an objective determination of price according to 
a single set of criteria or information. Karpik gives several illustrative examples of 
singularities markets, including French wines, records, contemporary painters, and 
French legal services. These examples are illustrative rather than empirically drawn 
out in depth, and without detailed exploration of the beliefs and judgments that give 
these markets life (see Healy, 2011). This lack of detail leaves the conceptual 
framework rather broad and open to interpretation.  
 
One question that arises, when trying to understand what a market singularity is, is the 
counterfactual: what is not a singularities market? The difference here is one of 
degree rather than of kind, since any market is likely to have products or entities 
within it that are distinctive and singular. For example, when purchasing eggs one 
might choose to buy eggs that have come from a particular collection of chickens that 
are distinctively reared. Though there are strong trends in many markets that push 
towards standardisation and homogeneousness, such as the purchase and consumption 
of basic UK supermarket dairy produce. Here standardisation and informational 
concerns like price and quantity are pervasive in purchasing decisions, and therefore 
basic supermarket dairy produce would be a market where the dominant trends are not 
those of singularity and distinctiveness. Karpik gives the example of the 
standardisation and impoverishment of classical music in which mass production and 
homogeneity have lessened personal judgment and interpretation within the market 
(Karpik, 2010: 251-252).  
 
Karpik’s (2010: 51) conceptual schema is focused around the socially constructed 
dimensions of valuation of distinctive goods and services. Karpik’s conception of 
value takes us beyond the reduction of value to price, to a broader conception of value 
that encompasses the social ascription of worth (see also Guyer, 2004). This is 
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contrary to the efficient markets hypothesis in economics, which is based on the idea 
that value is determined through market price and reflects the efficient processing of 
information.  
 
The difficulty that the efficient markets hypothesis has with market singularities is 
neatly reflected in the American economist Baumol’s (1987) characterisation of art 
markets as a ‘floating crap game’. As entities of ‘unnatural value’, Baumol argues that 
works of art do not have any equilibrium price level, and unlike the market for steel 
bolts fails to conform to economic laws of supply and demand. The economic 
reduction of price to supply and demand is equally unsuitable for the Bitcoin market 
because this obscures the crucial social judgments and questions that surround 
Bitcoin’s price valuation, such as why should Bitcoin have any value? (see Krugman, 
2013b). And how does one judge the ‘correct’ price of a Bitcoin when there are 
conflicting and polarised views about its worth? (see also Caliskan, 2007: 257; Guyer, 
2004: 93). Baumol’s difficulty in categorising art markets stems from the fact that, 
like other market singularities, value in art markets is not strictly quantifiable and not 
reducible to the ‘neutral’ processing of information; since socially constructed 
knowledge, beliefs and viewpoints are crucial to the valuation of singularities.  
 
Central to the existence of singularities markets is the classifications of people sharing 
broadly the ‘same point of view’ (Karpik, 2010: 31). In singularities markets 
judgment shapes purchasing decisions and judgment has a public, communicative 
quality (Karpik, 2010: 38). In this sense the two dimensions of value pointed to here, 
value as price and value as the ascription of worth (Guyer, 2004: 84), are 
interconnected and complimentary. In purchasing a cryptocurrency one is publically 
ascribing worth to a cryptographic network, which entails making a supporting 
judgment about its price.  
 
This act of judgment and ascribing value through purchasing requires networks and 
market devices to function, what Karpik (2010) refers to as ‘judgment devices’. 
Judgment devices are a broad ranging category that includes collective networks and 
expertise (Karpik, 2010: 49). Judgment devices ‘dissipate the opacity of the market’ 
and reduce the cognitive deficit by providing knowledge and expertise which serves 
as a guidepost for action (Karpik, 2010: 44-45). As Guyer (2004: 90) notes, 
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‘judgments can only work to structure pricing if expertise is brought to bear on the 
problem’. Twitter is an interesting example of a judgment device in the Bitcoin 
market, which can be classified as a ‘ciceron’ (Karpik, 2010: 45; Healy, 2011) – a 
judgment device that provides an arena for critics and commentators to comment on, 
and attempt to direct, the market.  
 
Twitter works differently from more established news media, such as television, 
because those with Twitter accounts tend to follow individuals with similar belief 
systems (Halberstam and Knight, 2014). So it serves as a particularly important 
judgment device in reinforcing ideological belief systems amongst particular 
communities of Tweeters. Garcia et al. (2014) find that spikes in Tweets about 
Bitcoin correspond closely to price hikes in Bitcoin and increasing usage. Although 
this relation seems to be more one of correlation than causation, Kaminski and Gloor 
(2016) for example find that Twitter signals do not predict Bitcoin price rises but high 
trading volumes do correspond to emotions flying high on Twitter. As they suggest, 
Twitter is a ‘virtual trading floor that emotionally reflects Bitcoin market movement’ 
(Kaminski and Gloor, 2016: 13). Thus Twitter works as an important judgment device 
in which actors reflect, and try to read, movements in the Bitcoin market. 
 
This application of Karpik’s work into the field of cryptocurrency moves us in a 
slightly different direction from other analyses of market singularities. In an 
interesting analysis of invitro-fertilisation and egg markets Waldby suggests that the 
market for singularities consists of ‘goods that, for the consumer, have no quantifiable 
equivalence or tradable value’ (Waldby, 2015: 280). While this characterisation does 
seem to apply to frozen eggs, which have a particularity, and a unique form that is 
intended to give life that takes precedence over ‘tradable value’, this does not seem to 
apply to other market singularities.  
 
Clearly in some singularities markets tradable value and appreciation plays a larger 
role than others. Singularities markets are often characterised by investor speculation. 
To take one example, consider the substantial holdings of valuable works of art, like 
great Picassos in free ports such as Singapore, which can then be easily exchanged. A 
singularities market has developed around great art in which famous pieces become 
tradable devices for investors to store capital (Knight, 2016). The market for 
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singularities can never be fully separated from quantifiable equivalence and tradable 
value. Since in the moment of decision when purchasing a singularity one is 
necessarily entering the realm of calculation. Karpik (2010: 118) expresses this as 
follows, ‘decision belongs to a world grounded in generalized equivalence whose 
actors are guided by a single criterion of action, while judgment belongs to a world… 
characterised by a plurality of evaluation criteria’. And both calculation and judgment 
are integral to the decision to purchase a singularity. For some actors entering a given 
singularities market, profiting from price appreciation is likely to be the predominant 
motive. The tradable values in singularities markets are speculative and uncertain (see 
Karpik, 2010: 11), since they depend on the extent to which certain kinds of 
knowledge and particular viewpoints are adopted and followed.  
 
There is a strange hybrid character to markets for singularities because the items in 
question are not reducible to any simple calculation of price, yet some investors join 
the market for a projected appreciation of ‘tradable value’ and do not necessarily 
share in the belief system that gives the entity its worth as a valued singularity. This 
motivation for investing in Bitcoin is reflected by Michael Novogratz, the co-chief 
investment officer of Fortress Management Group, who explains his companies’ 
interest in Bitcoin thus, ‘there are enough libertarian (anti) government guys to at 
least make this a bubble’ (Foley, 2013). Alongside the important shared belief 
systems that characterise singularities markets, there are also those who join these 
markets because of their perception of investor behaviour, deduced from a judgment 
about the beliefs of other market members. 
 
While judgment devices are central to processes of price formation, singularities 
markets must also possess some more formalised aspects in how goods are purchased 
and exchanged. When emphasising the elements of judgment and knowledge, Karpik 
gives little detail about how singularities markets are actually enacted and here 
particular sites where exchanges happen are important (see Caliskan, 2007). Sites or 
places of exchange are strangely absent from Karpik’s account but he does recognise 
the interpenetration between judgment devices and the act of exchange (Karpik, 2010: 
105). However, the concrete site of exchange has its own rules and norms, which he 
rather neglects. If one takes a singularities market such as antique furniture, the role 
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of the auction house or websites like eBay are an important component of these 
markets.  
 
As the concrete sites of exchange that give the market life, Bitcoin exchanges are 
crucial. Bitcoin are acquired mainly through exchanges but these exchanges are not 
legally regulated in the way in which the exchange of government backed fiat 
currencies is, since Bitcoin is not generally considered as legal tender. This makes 
feedback and trust crucial to the operation of exchanges. Karpik (2010: 66) argues 
that trust is essential to the maintenance of singularities markets. Trust is a broad and 
rather ambiguous category in Karpik’s analysis, which has a foundational status 
connected to knowledge and belief (Karpik, 2010: 60). Trust is important to Bitcoin 
exchanges because in the absence of the state, one must believe that the exchange site 
one is undertaking transactions on (and/or storing Bitcoin) will continue to exist, be 
secure, and not defraud the user. Maurer et al. (2013: 274) describe the networks of 
trust around Bitcoin as a ‘sociality of trust’, while Karpik (2010: 65) refers to it as 
‘relational trust’. Thus the role of user feedback and judgment devices in establishing 
the reliability and trustworthiness of exchanges becomes central. The importance of 
trust in the Bitcoin market again highlights the inherently social dimension of 
singularities markets. And given the uncertainties around price valuation, this 
sociality is underpinned by beliefs. 
 
The Bitcoin Community and Libertarianism 
 
Shared beliefs are crucial to the existence of market singularities. As Karpik (2010: 
61-62) describes, ‘to believe is to inhabit a quasi world richer than the real world, a 
quasi world protected from the world’. In a revealing 2010 quote from Nakamoto on a 
Bitcoin discussion forum, the electronic currency is characterised as follows, ‘I think 
the most apt description of Bitcoins is that they are shares of stock in this communal 
Bitcoin enterprise we are undertaking’ (Nakamoto, 2014: 283, my italics). The notion 
of Bitcoin as a communal enterprise highlights the shared belief system, a shared act 
of faith in blockchain cryptography.  
 
While Karpik (2010) places considerable emphasis on shared beliefs as a defining 
feature of singularities markets, and emphasizes the role of shared ‘points of view’, 
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the political dimensions of this receive little attention. Yet the implications of this are 
clearly political, since ‘each viewpoint carries its own criteria of evaluation, which 
express a principle for organizing the world’ (Karpik, 2010: 40). Indeed, because 
money is inescapably political, in that monetary choices entail contests that result in 
decisions that favour some actors over others within a given society (Kirshner, 2010: 
646-647), Bitcoin’s status as a trailblazer in the field of electronic currency - the first 
and most recognised of its kind - means that it is a market singularity with an 
important ideological and political dimension. And the key political belief 
underpinning Bitcoin is a broad libertarian conviction that an alternative money 
system based on cryptography, which is beyond the control of the state, is both 
sustainable and desirable. 
 
The currency has some natural affinities with the key economic ideas of the Austrian 
School, such as the ultimate subjectivity of value, an anti-inflationary standpoint and 
a deep distrust of state intervention. As von Mises (2012: 29) notes, ‘it is not the state 
but the common practice of all those who have dealings in the market, that creates 
money’. The idea that the fundamental feature of how money works is not legal 
tender and state authority, but rather the subjective ascription of value is central to 
Austrian School thought and chimes with the beliefs of the Bitcoin community.   
 
The subjective conception of value is perhaps most clearly expressed by Carl Menger. 
Menger argues against the idea that value is inherent in things; for him valuation ‘is a 
judgment economizing men make about the importance of the goods at their disposal’ 
(Menger, 2007: 121). Judgments of value involve the subjective ordering of needs and 
wants for Menger (2007: 194), and – as is customary in economic theory - value is 
understood ultimately through price. Menger’s arguments for the subjective origins of 
value are central to economic libertarian thought and are complimentary with the idea 
that Bitcoin has a sustainable price value; an assumption that other economists have 
questioned (see for example Cheah and Fry, 2015). His subjective account of value 
has certain similarities but also important differences from Karpik’s (2010) 
conception of market singularities. Value is not inherent for either Karpik or Menger, 
but in Menger’s account the process of ascribing value begins from the subjective, 
while for Karpik (2010) the starting point of the analysis is quite different. Karpik’s 
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principal interest is in the social devices and networks that give market singularities 
life.  
 
Hayek’s (1976) arguments for the denationalisation of money also echo the aims of 
sections of the Bitcoin community (ECB, 2012: 22). Hayek’s call for an open 
competition between different forms of currency that are not regulated by the state – 
essentially a free trade in money and monetary systems - arises from a fundamental 
distrust of government regulation of the money supply and a faith in the open 
expression of self-interest through market competition (Hayek, 1976: 130-131). As 
Hayek sees it, this competition would occur between money systems that can be 
created by private institutions and individuals who are free to compete with existing 
state backed fiat currency. Bitcoin is intended to deliver on both these counts: in being 
released through a mining process at a set rate its issuance is not controlled by a 
central authority or government; second, because its growth and usage is dependent 
purely on people choosing to use the currency rather than the requirements of any 
state authority. 
 
Although I have characterised Bitcoin as assuming more of an asset like status, it 
should be noted that Bitcoin can also be held as an asset because it projects a 
libertarian viewpoint about how the money system could or should be (see Dodd, 
2012), even if it does not currently serve as money for the majority of users. The 
development of Bitcoin soon after the financial crisis was partly a reaction to 
concerns about the government backed fiat currency system, which it was trying to 
present some kind of alternative to. As Nakamoto (2009) notes, ‘banks must be 
trusted to hold our money and transfer it electronically, but they lend it out in waves 
of credit bubbles with barely a fraction in reserve’.  
 
Golumbia (2015; 2016) draws out the key libertarian political beliefs surrounding 
Bitcoin, characterising it as an ‘extreme rightist-anarcho-capitalist, winner-take-all… 
political vision’ (see also Scott, 2014). This anti-state ideology gives rise to a range of 
problems and inconsistencies, for example he highlights an interesting tension in 
Bitcoins’ anti-government libertarian ethos between Bitcoin advocates who celebrate 
its growing acceptance among banks and established financial players; and other 
members of the community who are convinced of Bitcoin’s status as an alternative 
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financial asset that breaks with the existing economic order. The former development 
is clearly inconsistent with the latter claim.  
 
While many aspects of Golumbia’s characterisation of the Bitcoin community ring 
true, the approach presented here has two principal differences from his account: 
First, Golumbia seems to have little interest in the question which guides this analysis, 
which is why has Bitcoin’s price value proven to be more durable than many 
economists have predicted? I argue that Karpik (2010) helps us to explain at least 
some of the reasons for this and that existing economic critiques miss a crucial 
ingredient of Bitcoin’s price valuation, which is the beliefs of the Bitcoin community. 
Second, Golumbia’s project is focused on establishing Bitcoin’s connections to right 
wing economic libertarianism, but this rather neglects the diversity of the Bitcoin 
community and the differences between libertarian perspectives, such as between 
cypherpunks and economic libertarians. Cypherpunks are more interested in social 
freedoms and have concerns about state monitoring and privacy (for an early 
founding statement of the cypherpunk ethos and how it relates to cryptography see 
Hamill, 1987). While economic libertarians place a greater emphasis on economic 
freedom and an anti-tax, anti-regulatory agenda; the objectives of the cypherpunks are 
centred on enabling privacy through cryptography. While the two do overlap in the 
Bitcoin case they can also be distinguished. Thus Golumbia tends to overlook 
political differences within the Bitcoin community. 
 
This brings us to another dimension of Bitcoin’s economic value, which is the 
existence of darknet markets, the most famous of which was Silk Road. Silk Road 
became a high profile website for the purchase of illegal drugs and other nefarious 
activities from its creation in 2011 to its shutdown and the seizure of the Bitcoin held 
on the website by the FBI in 2013. Bitcoin has served as the principal currency with 
which to purchase illicit substances online, largely because of the partial anonymity it 
provides (see Meiklejohn et al., 2013).  
 
While the purchase of online illegal drugs provides perhaps a more concrete reference 
point for Bitcoin’s price valuation than libertarian beliefs, the fact that Bitcoin enables 
trades on darknet markets is very much consistent with the libertarian, cypherpunk, 
anti-government regulation ethos of parts of the Bitcoin community. Although here 
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the libertarianism is arguably more social than economic – the concern is less with the 
perceived threat posed by central banking, and instead the objective is to give people 
the social freedom to purchase illicit substances online free from the threat of 
prosecution. The purchase of illicit substances on the darknet market then adds 
another dimension to the libertarian ideology that helps to sustain Bitcoin’s economic 
value. 
 
Within the Bitcoin community people believe for different reasons, there are believers 
who are more interested in its status as a speculative libertarian financial asset and 
store Bitcoin in the hope that its price value will appreciate; and others of a more 
socially libertarian persuasion who see it as a means to undertake economic 
transactions with a greater degree of freedom from state control. While some of the 
viewpoints within the Bitcoin community are more explicitly politically libertarian 
than others, they all must share a political belief that it is beneficial or desirable to 
have a cryptographic currency/asset that operates independently of national 
governments and central banks.  
 
Bitcoin Centralization and Governance 
 
Bitcoin has been characterised as a market singularity underpinned by libertarian 
political beliefs. In this final part of the paper I draw out some tensions in Bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrency communities around market centralization and governance. 
These two issues are often linked, since as we shall see, the debates about whether 
Bitcoin needs improved governance connect to problems of centralization and 
ownership concentration. While it is often claimed that Bitcoin is a decentralized 
peer2peer network, recent challenges in the field of cryptocurrency have brought to 
the fore operational issues that render this proposition more questionable.  
 
Wilde (2013) reports that 927 people own half of the Bitcoins in circulation, which is 
clearly a highly a heavily concentrated level of ownership. This runs contrary to the 
idea that Bitcoin is decentralized, since while the peer2peer network is based on 
ideals of decentralization, ‘significant economic forces push towards de facto 
centralization’ (Böhme et al., 2015: 219-220), including ownership concentration 
amongst a small number of wealthy investors. One of the problems with this 
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concentration of ownership is that it means that single large transactions can have 
major effects on value – for example Bovaird (2016) reports that a drop of 5% in 
Bitcoin price in half-an-hour on 11 September 2016 is likely to have been caused by a 
single trade. The danger with this high level of ownership concentration is that it can 
lead to a relatively illiquid market, which works against Bitcoin becoming an 
alternative money system that is widely used for everyday transactions. 
 
One further centralization in the Bitcoin market concerns mining capacity, which 
illustrates how dominant parties can exert major political influence on how markets 
operate. Miners expend large amounts of electricity and increasing levels of computer 
power to discover hash codes that lead to the release of the next block of transactions 
for which they receive a Bitcoin payment as a reward. Because of the ever increasing 
computer power mining requires it has become the province of a small number of 
institutions with sufficient capacity. Around 70% of Bitcoin mining in June 2016 was 
carried out by a collection of four Chinese mining institutions (Popper, 2016).  
 
The blockchain has been beset by political disagreements in recent years, because of 
the increasing amount of time it takes to process transactions due to a 1MB cap on 
block size. A division emerged between those known as Bitcoin Core, which wants to 
continue to work with the existing model without fundamentally changing the block 
size, and Bitcoin Classic who are seeking to increase the block size (see Ennis, 2016). 
Miners have a crucial position in the Bitcoin ecosystem since the software they 
choose to run to mine Bitcoin become the software that is used throughout the 
network, which gives them sizeable decision making power (Popper, 2016). Bitcoin 
does not have any central authority to resolve these competing conceptions of the 
blockchain, which means that miners have a major role in deciding the software 
model that is adopted. The four major mining institutions in China have effectively 
used their considerable power to prevent any proposed increase in block size from 
getting off the ground (Hearn, 2016; Popper, 2016). Centralized mining power means 
that a handful of institutions have substantial decision making power over how the 
blockchain operates. The existence of heavily concentrated mining capacity translates 
into sizeable political power for select groups, which illustrates how concentrations of 
economic power can lead to concentrations of political power in cryptocurrency 
markets. 
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Another tension around governance and the blockchain is reflected in other 
adaptations of the Bitcoin protocol. As an ideological market singularity Bitcoin 
shows that cryptography can open up a range of different political possibilities in 
currency design (DuPont, 2014; see also Terranova and Fumagalli, 2015). Because 
Bitcoin works according to ‘predetermined rules encoded in an open source software 
platform’ (Weber, 2015: 139), an adaption of these rules could potentially create 
platforms for different ideologies. Although a proviso is in order here, since as 
Minksy (1986: 228) notes, ‘everyone can create money; the problem is to get it 
accepted’ and other electronic currencies have far lower capitalisation, acceptance and 
recognition than Bitcoin does. Having said this, a whole range of other 
cryptocurrency experiments have developed in recent years which embody slightly 
different principles in their peer2peer blockchain design, such as Namecoin, 
Dogecoin, Zcash and numerous others. One interesting case, of this - which brings to 
the fore questions around the governance of the blockchain - is Ethereum. 
 
Ethereum’s unit of account is Ether, which is intended to facilitate decentralized 
applications of the blockchain protocol through smart contracts. One application 
known as the Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO) provided a means to 
govern investment capital without any central authority. However, due to a 
transaction vulnerability in the code, the DAO which had received around $1 million 
in Ether could be moved into another DAO which one exploiter then had total voting 
power over (Lackness, 2016), enabling them to seize the invested Ether. This left a 
number of Ethereum investors in the DAO unhappy, because they had lost their Ether 
investments due to this vulnerability and demanded to be reimbursed. In response to 
this pressure, the developers created a hard fork in the blockchain in which on one 
side the exploiter received the Ether and on the other the Ether was returned to 
investors. The creation of this hard fork to reimburse investors prompted a polarised 
reaction in the electronic currency community with some critics like the Ethereum 
developer Felföldi (2016) arguing that the ‘money is the rightful property of the 
“thief”’.  Felföldi (2016) proposes that there should be no recourse to an abstract 
‘higher justice’ that takes precedence over the ‘immutable law of code’. 
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This division and the resulting hard fork within the Ethereum blockchain illustrates 
how cryptocurrency communities can be divided by competing political ideals. For 
some participants’ faith in the code as a ‘just’ system takes precedence over abstract 
normative concerns about ‘justice’ and fairness; while for others providing financial 
redress to victims of ‘fraud’ took precedence. The absence of any legal authority 
meant that the developers had to make a decision to resolve the dispute, and decided 
to fork the blockchain to respect ‘honest’ market investors against such hacks and 
reimburse the Ether that was lost. Thus as a politicised market singularity Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies can have fundamental political divisions that on occasion come to 
the fore in the absence of any central authority.  
 
Cryptocurrencies then present an interesting case of political tensions around beliefs 
within singularities markets – particularly because they operate to a large extent 
beyond the province of the state (Karpik, 2010: 56). Questions of governance can 
become significant points of division in singularities markets and this political 
dimension is given little attention in Karpik’s analysis. The Bitcoin market, in 
presenting an ideal of what an alternative monetary system might look like, is 
inevitably political. And this is also a key reason why, despite internal political 
divisions, its economic value has proven to be a great deal more durable than many 




Bitcoin has assumed the status of a peculiar speculative asset (Burniske and White, 
2016), one that also - although to a lesser degree - serves as a currency with which to 
purchase particular goods and services. Bitcoin retains a community of followers and 
has prompted numerous discussions in web forums around its status as an asset and its 
design.  
 
There is an important ingredient missing from existing accounts of Bitcoin, which is 
addressed by focusing on how the Bitcoin market operates, and situating the politics 
surrounding it. Drawing on and developing Karpik’s (2010) conception of market 
singularities has helped us to engage with the belief systems and judgment devices 
that underpin this speculative asset. Conventional economic readings that have 
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understood Bitcoin purely as a speculative bubble (Krugman, 2013a) follow the 
problematic tendency that Galbraith (2001: 79) notes, which is for economists to 
understand motivation in purely economic terms. In singularities markets there are 
other important sources of motivation at work, including political conviction.  
 
Furthermore, the brief discussion of the Ethereum smart contract experiment suggests 
that there is considerable scope for further case study analysis of the belief systems 
underpinning different cryptocurrencies. Drawing on Karpik’s (2010) framework, this 
paper provides an illustration of how the concept of market singularities might be 
fruitfully applied to different cryptocurrencies in the future, to examine the 
similarities and differences between them. 
 
While Karpik (2010) draws attention to the importance of beliefs in singularities 
markets, in the case of cryptocurrency we have seen that belief systems can also 
contain significant political differences within them. Indeed, the political divisions 
within singularities markets have thus far been a neglected area of investigation. The 
analysis of Bitcoin as a market singularity has also highlighted how the design and 
issuance of any monetary system is essentially political. 
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